A carbon subsidy framework for coordinated low-carbon operation in industrial park with multiple users

Abstract

As the global impacts of carbon emissions intensify, power markets are shifting from profit-driven models to frameworks that integrate economic performance and carbon mitigation. Current low-carbon approaches commonly exhibit insufficient user response, elevated abatement costs, complex implementation, and limited flexibility. To bridge this gap, we propose a carbon subsidy framework for industrial parks. In this framework, the Industrial Park Operator (IPO) announces real-time shared electricity, carbon, and subsidy prices, while users optimize load scheduling and market participation. The interaction is formulated as a Stackelberg game and solved using a Differential Evolution-Mixed-Integer Quadratic Programming (DE-MIQP) approach. Case studies demonstrate that, compared with a baseline without subsidies, the IPO provides a total subsidy of 1,295.57 CNY, the proposed framework reduces industrial-park CO2 emissions by 40.13 %, and the IPO’s profit decreases by 217.39 CNY, while the users’ aggregate profit increases by 608.3 CNY. Finally, two sensitivity analyses are conducted: one investigates parameter sensitivity, and the other is a ten-user case study that exhibits emission-reduction behavior similar to that of the four-user case. These findings confirm that the carbon subsidy framework effectively incentivizes user participation, reduces emissions, and offers a practical pathway for coordinated low-carbon operation in multi-user industrial parks.

HIGHLIGHTS • Carbon subsidy framework for coordinated low-carbon industrial park operation. • Stackelberg game with DE-MIQP preserves user privacy while finding equilibrium. • Subsidy cuts park CO2 emissions by 40.13 % and SPP output by 47.01 % versus baseline. • Profit shifts: IPO -217.39 CNY, users +608.3 CNY, subsidies total 1,295.57 CNY. • Sensitivity and ten-user studies confirm robustness and scalability of the scheme.