The liability of third parties appointed to satisfy a tax debt in terms of section 179 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011

Abstract

This study evaluates whether SARS’s power to appoint third-party agents for tax debt collection unjustifiably limits taxpayers’ constitutional rights under sections 22, 25, 33, and 34 of the Constitution. Although it is not a constitutional analysis per se, it examines the procedural and substantive fairness of this mechanism, focusing on issues such as: who must prove the taxpayer’s financial capacity, how affordability is determined, consequences of not making representations, enforcement against offshore assets, potential unlawful credit extension, lack of judicial oversight, and the effectiveness of available legal remedies. It also considers whether SARS’s dual role as debt collector and affordability assessor creates a conflict of interest, whether bypassing notice requirements undermines administrative justice, and whether current laws adequately protect taxpayers from disproportionate rights infringements. Finally, the study suggests possible legislative reforms to better align the system with constitutional standards.